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Abstract
Welfare state models have focused almost exclusively on the study of cash benefits, and
typologies established on this limited basis have been used to generalise about all forms of
welfare state provision. This ignores the fact that welfare states are also about the actual delivery
of services and/or that countries vary in terms of the relative emphasis that they place upon
cash benefits and welfare state services. This article explores the cash and services mix in, and
between, welfare states with reference to recent welfare state typologies, most notably Esping-
Andersen’s decommodification-centred ‘worlds of welfare’. It compares the decommodification
levels of the main cash benefits with the main area of service provision: health care. The resulting
analysis suggests that when services are added into the comparative analysis of welfare state
regimes there are five welfare state clusters: Social Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, and sub-
groups within both the Liberal and Conservative regimes. The article concludes that, in order
to maintain integrity or generalisability, future welfare state typologies need to reflect more
adequately the role of services in welfare state provision.
Introduction
Welfare state modelling has long been a preoccupation of comparative social
policy (Wilensky and Lebraux, 1958; Titmuss, 1974; Therborn, 1987; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Castles and Mitchell, 1993). Recently, the literature has been
dominated by the extensive, and on-going, debate that has surrounded Esping-
Andersen’s influential analysis of welfare state decommodification and the
resulting ‘three worlds of welfare’ typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Lewis,
1992; Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Orloff, 1993; Borchost, 1994;
Daly, 1994; Kangas, 1994; Ragin, 1994; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Goodin
et al., 1999; Sainsbury, 1994, 1999; Abrahamson, 1999; Pitruzzello, 1999; Arts and
Gelissen, 2002; Kasza, 2002). However, what is remarkable about this debate is
that, while there are numerous critiques about his range (Leibfried, 1992; Castles
and Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997), his methodology (Kangas, 1994;
Ragin, 1994; Pitruzzello, 1999) and the absence of gender in his typology
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(Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1994, 1999; Bambra, 2004a), core procedures
have attracted less attention: the analytical focus on cash benefits (Alber, 1995;
Abrahamson, 1999; Kautto, 2002; Bambra, 2005) and the creation of regimes that
generalise about all forms of social policy provision from this base (Kasza, 2002).
This ignores the fact that welfare states are also about the actual delivery of
services, such as health, education or social care, and that, far from being internally
consistent, countries vary in terms of the relative emphasis that they place upon
cash benefits and/or welfare state services (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Castles, 1998;
Kautto, 2002). Indeed, welfare services may well account for the greatest differen-
ces both between and within countries’ welfare state arrangements (Castles, 1998).
Health care is by far the largest area of welfare state service delivery,
accounting as it does for an average of 6.6 per cent of GDP in the EU member
states (Eurostat, 2001). Although it has been subject to extensive separate com-
parative analysis (Ham, 1997; Moran, 1999, 2000; Freeman and Moran, 2000;
Freeman, 2000), health care has been a significant and notable omission from
the broader welfare state literature and particularly the regimes debate (Bambra,
2005). However, as some commentators such as Ginsburg (1992) and Moran
(1999) have suggested, it is a strong example of internal welfare state inconsistency
in the provision of cash benefits and welfare services. They assert that there is a
significant difference between the principles behind the UK’s market-orientated
cash benefit programmes and its state-dominated health care provision. This
discrepancy has also been touched upon in exploratory research by the author
on the health care provision of different welfare states (Bambra, 2005). This
article takes such analysis further by examining in depth the cash and services
mix in, and between, welfare states through the detailed comparison of the
decommodification levels of the main cash benefits (pensions, sickness and
unemployment) with the main area of service provision: health care.
The article proceeds with a brief outline of Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds
of welfare’ thesis and the subsequent debate that has emerged around it. It then
discusses the concept of decommodification and presents an updated version
of Esping-Andersen’s cash benefit decommodification index and a similarly
constructed health care services index. The results of these two indexes are
compared and used to explore the internal and external diversity of countries’
cash benefit and welfare service arrangements, and what they mean for the ‘three
worlds of welfare’ and welfare state modelling.
The ‘Three Worlds of Welfare’
In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen argues that ‘existing
theoretical models of the welfare state are inadequate’ (1990: 2) as their analysis
relies too heavily upon the misleading comparison of aggregate welfare state
expenditure. The focus on total expenditure figures conceals the variety of state
approaches to welfare as, ‘even if the lion’s share of expenditure or personnel
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TABLE 1. The three worlds of welfare.
Liberal Conservative Social Democratic
Australia Austria Denmark
Canada Belgium Finland
Ireland France Norway
New Zealand Germany Sweden
UK Italy
USA Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
Source: adapted from Esping-Andersen, 1990: 52.
serves welfare aims, the kind of welfare provided will be qualitatively different,
as will its prioritisation relative to competing activities’ (1990: 1). He asserts that
it is therefore more beneficial to focus upon what a welfare state does, rather
than how much money it is afforded. On this basis, Esping-Andersen (1990:
52) presents a three-fold typology of welfare state regimes based largely on the
principle of labour market decommodification: Liberal, Conservative and Social
Democratic (see Table 1).
In the welfare states of the Liberal regime (UK, USA, Ireland, Canada,
Australia), state provision of welfare is minimal, benefits are modest and often
attract strict entitlement criteria, and recipients are usually means-tested and
stigmatised (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26). In this model, the dominance of the
market is encouraged both passively, by guaranteeing only a minimum, and
actively, by subsidising private welfare schemes (ibid: 27). The Liberal welfare
state regime thereby minimises the decommodification effects of state welfare
and a stark division exists between those, largely the poor, who rely on state aid
and those who are able to afford private provision.
The Conservative welfare state regime (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium,
Italy and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands) is distinguished by its ‘status
differentiating’ welfare programmes in which benefits are often earnings-related,
administered through the employer, and geared towards maintaining existing
social patterns. The role of the family is also emphasised and the redistributive
impact is minimal. However, the role of the market is marginalised, and therefore
Esping-Andersen places it between the low decommodifying Liberal regime and
the highly decommodifying Social Democratic regime (1990: 27).
The ‘third world of welfare’, the Social Democratic (Nordic countries), is the
clearly the smallest regime cluster. Its provision is characterised by universal and
comparatively generous benefits, a commitment to full employment and income
protection, and a strongly interventionist state. The state is used to promote
social equality through a redistributive social security system. Unlike the other
welfare state regimes, the Social Democratic regime type ‘promotes an equality
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of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs’ and it provides ‘a
mix of highly decommodifying and universalistic programs’ (Esping-Andersen,
1990: 28).
The ‘worlds of welfare’ debate
This ‘three worlds’ typology has sparked a volatile and ongoing debate (Sainsbury,
1999; Goodin et al., 1999; Pitruzzello, 1999; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Kasza, 2002)
and, indeed, much of the burgeoning comparative welfare state literature since
1990 can be seen as a ‘settling of accounts’ with Esping-Andersen (Pierson, 1998:
175). This debate has been dominated by three principle critiques: the range
(Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997), the
methodology (Kangas, 1994; Ragin, 1994; Pitruzzello, 1999) and the omission
of gender in the analysis (Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Borchost, 1994; Daly, 1994,
Sainsbury, 1999). Two other critiques of the ‘three worlds of welfare’ typology,
and indeed of welfare state modelling as a whole, have been less prominent: the
usefulness of the regimes concept (Kasza, 2002) and the focus on cash benefits
(Alber, 1995; Abrahamson, 1999; Kautto, 2002).
The limited range
The range of countries used to construct Esping-Andersen’s typology has met
with criticism (Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli,
1997). Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) assert that a distinctive
fourth type of welfare state regime is emerging in the countries of the Latin rim
of the European Union (Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy).
Leibfried (1992) describes these welfare states as ‘rudimentary’ because they are
characterised by their fragmented system of welfare provision, which consists of
diverse cash benefit schemes that range from the meagre to the generous, and a
health care system that provides only limited and partial coverage.
Castles and Mitchell (1993) similarly challenge the notion that there are only
three worlds of welfare. They cross-classify the same 18 OECD nations used by
Esping-Andersen and examine their high and low aggregate expenditure levels,
and their high and low degrees of benefit equality. On the basis of this analysis,
they claim that a fourth, ‘radical’, world of welfare should be added to the thesis
(Castles and Mitchell, 1993: 107). They argue that the UK, Australia and New
Zealand constitute a ‘radical’ form of welfare state regime, one in which ‘the
welfare goals of poverty amelioration and income equality are pursued through
redistributive instruments rather than by high expenditure levels’ (Castles and
Mitchell, 1993: 107).
The methodological approach
A more general methodological critique of Esping-Andersen has been
developed through the use of cluster analysis. Kangas (1994) performed a cluster
analysis of indicators of sickness insurance for the same 18 OECD countries. The
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results broadly confirmed Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds’ thesis, although the
existence of a coherent Liberal regime was questioned: no clear Liberal regime
cluster was identified as, while the UK, Ireland, New Zealand and Australia
were merged together, the USA and Canada were separate outliers. However,
a more comprehensive cluster analysis (Pitruzello, 1999) of all three of Esping-
Andersen’s decommodification factors (sickness, pensions and unemployment)
revealed a number of significant discrepancies. Pitruzzello’s research showed
significant support for the existence and distinctiveness of welfare regimes, but it
challenged the empirical accuracy of the ‘three worlds’ typology: the antipodes
were identified as a distinctive fourth cluster and a sub-group of the corporatist
cluster emerged. This suggested that there could be four or five ‘worlds of welfare’
(Pitruzello, 1999: 23–50).
The gender blind ‘worlds of welfare’
This is perhaps the most developed and influential critique of the ‘three
worlds of welfare’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Bambra, 2004). Feminist comment-
ators (such as Lewis, 1992; Borchost, 1994; Bussemaker and Kersbergen, 1994;
Daly, 1994; Hobson, 1994; Lewis and Ostner, 1995; Sainsbury, 1994, 1999) have
argued that Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds of welfare’ typology is deeply flawed
because it marginalised women in its analysis. Aside from the overt absence of
women in Esping-Andersen’s analysis, the critique revolves around three other
issues: the gender blind concept of decommodification (Daly, 1994; Hobson,
1994; Lewis, 1992), the unawareness of the role of women and the family in
the provision of welfare (Borchost, 1994; Bussemaker and Kersbergen, 1994;
Daly, 1994), and the lack of consideration given to gender as a form of social
stratification (Bussemaker and Kersbergen, 1994). These criticisms have in turn
led to both theoretical attempts to ‘gender’ Esping-Andersen’s analysis (for
example, Orloff, 1993; O’Connor, 1993), and the construction of alternative
welfare state typologies in which gender has been a more overt and centralised
part of the analysis (for example, Lewis, 1992; Lewis and Ostner, 1995; Sainsbury,
1999). These alternative typologies, although often flawed themselves (Esping-
Andersen, 1999), have undermined confidence in the comprehensiveness and
generalisability of the ‘three worlds of welfare’ thesis, especially in respect to any
claims about women, welfare and the family.
The ‘illusion’ of welfare state regimes
Kasza (2002) has questioned the validity of the regimes concept itself. He
argues that the concept of welfare regimes incorporates two flawed assumptions:
firstly, that most of the key social policy areas, such as income maintenance (cash
benefits), education, health or housing, within a welfare regime will reflect a
similar, across the board, approach to welfare provision; and, secondly, that each
regime type itself reflects ‘a set of principles or values that establishes a coherence
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in each country’s welfare package’ (Kasza, 2002: 272). Kasza asserts that instead
of an internal policy homogeneity or cohesion, welfare states and welfare regimes
exhibit significant variation across different areas of social provision. He asserts
that the regime concept therefore ‘does not capture the complex motives that
inform each country’s welfare programs’ and, in pursuit of consistency, it ignores
the fact that different areas of welfare state provision exhibit different cross-
national variations. Kasza’s critique has been shown to be particularly applicable
to health care (Bambra, 2005) although it is not without its own limitations
(Bambra, 2004a).
The dominance of cash over services
This critique focuses on Esping-Andersen’s decision to organise the principle
of classification around the study of cash benefit programmes (Alber, 1995;
Abrahamson, 1999; Kautto, 2002). The ‘three worlds of welfare’ typology is
largely based on a comparison of the decommodification of three cash benefit
programmes: pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment benefits. This
ignores the fact that welfare states are also about the actual delivery of services,
such as education, health or social services (Kautto, 2002). It is suggested that
countries vary in terms of the emphasis that they place upon welfare state
services and/or social transfers: the Social Democratic welfare states have high
spending on both cash benefits and welfare services; the Conservative countries
are more inclined to fund cash benefits than welfare services; and the Liberal
countries are divided into two sub-groups, one that is prepared to spend a little
more on services and the other that is consistently low in all forms of social
expenditure (Castles, 1998). These differences are not adequately reflected in
Esping-Andersen’s typology.
The later two critiques have been less extensively explored both empirically
and within the regimes debate. This article will now examine what they may mean
for the ‘welfare modeling business’ (Abrahamson, 1999) and the construction of
typologies through the detailed comparison of a more up-to-date reconstruction
of Esping-Andersen’s decommodification index with a current index of health
care services decommodification.
Decommodification
It is important to acknowledge the importance of going beyond aggregate
measures of welfare and so, in comparing the relative role of cash benefits and
welfare services, the concept of decommodification, as pioneered in comparative
welfare research by Esping-Andersen, has been kept. Decommodification refers
to ‘the extent to which individuals and families can maintain a normal and
socially acceptable standard of living regardless of their market performance’
(Esping-Andersen, 1987: 86). Commodification, on the other hand, refers to the
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extent to which workers and their families are reliant upon the market sale of their
labour. Labour became extensively commodified during the industrial revolution
as workers became entirely dependent upon the market for their survival (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 21). In the twentieth century, the introduction of social rights
that entailed entitlement to social welfare brought about a ‘loosening’ of the pure
commodity status of labour. The welfare state decommodified labour because
certain services and a certain standard of living became a right of citizenship and
reliance on the market for survival decreased (1990: 22). However, it must be noted
that under capitalism, while the pure commodification of labour is possible, its
pure decommodification is not (O’Connor, 1993: 61). The issue is therefore the
relative degrees of protection from dependence on the labour market provided by
the welfare state in the form of cash benefits. When extended to cover health care
provision, decommodification refers to the extent to which an individual’s access
to health care is dependent upon their market position and the extent to which
a country’s provision of health is independent from the market (Bambra, 2005).
Decommodification indexes
The cash benefit and health care decommodification indexes are constructed
in the same way as Esping-Andersen’s original indexes (Esping-Andersen, 1990:
54; Bambra, 2004a, b, 2005) even though this methodology has met with some
criticism within the literature (Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Kangas, 1994; Ragin,
1994; Pitruzello, 1999). It is important to replicate Esping-Andersen’s method to
ensure compatibility and comparability.
Countries
The decommodification indexes include the same 18 OECD countries used
by Esping-Andersen in the 1980s: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
Data and sources
The data used to compile the indexes relate to the years 1997, 1998 and
1999. The majority of data that have been used are of an international nature
(such as that published by the Eurostat, UN or the OECD). The international
nature of these data has helped to minimise any cross-national differences over
their measurement, definition and collection. These measures should ensure data
comparability both between countries and between Esping-Andersen’s original
index and the ones in this article.
Measures
The cash benefits decommodification index is based on the assessment of a
number of factors relating to the three main cash benefit programmes: pensions,
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TABLE 2. Cash benefit index measures.
Pensions Unemployment Sickness
(1) Minimum pension
benefits for a standard
production worker
earning average wages
(1) Pre-taxation benefit
replacement rates for a
standard worker during
the first 26 weeks of
unemployment
(1) Pre-taxation benefit
replacement rates for a
standard worker during
the first 26 weeks of
sickness
(2) Standard pension benefits
for a normal worker
(2) Number of weeks
employment prior to
qualification for benefit
(2) Number of weeks
employment prior to
qualification for benefit
(3) Contribution period
required for a minimum
pension1
(3) Number of waiting days
before benefits are paid
(3) Number of waiting days
before benefits are paid
(4) Individual’s share of
pension financing
(4) Usual number of weeks
in which benefit can be
maintained
(4) Number of weeks in
which benefit can be
maintained
(5) Percentage of the
(relevant) population
covered by the program
(5) Percentage of the
(relevant) population
covered by the program
(5) Percentage of the
(relevant) population
covered by the program
Note: 1Esping-Andersen uses the contribution period for the standard pension as his measure-
ment. However, due to data availability problems, the contribution period for the minimum
pension benefit has been used here.
Source: based on Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54.
TABLE 3. Health care index measures.
Health care
(1) Private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP – this factor refers to the extent of private
financing by identifying the extent of a country’s total income that is spent on private health
care
(2) Private hospital beds as a percentage of total bed stock – this factor is used to express the
extent of private provision at a practical level within a health care system
(3) The percentage of the population covered by the health care system – this shows the extent
of general access provided by the public health care system
Source: Based on Bambra, 2005.
unemployment and sickness (see Table 2) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bambra,
2004b).
The health care services decommodification index has been constructed
through the assessment of three measures (see Table 3).
These factors have been selected because they assess the financing, provision
and coverage of the private sector and are therefore useful indicators of the varied
role of the market in a health care system: the larger the size of the private health
sector, in terms of expenditure and consumption, the larger the role of the market
and therefore the lower the degree of health decommodification (Bambra, 2005).
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TABLE 4. Degrees of decommodification.
Cash benefits Health care services
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Finland 34.6 7.5 50 7.3
Norway 34.0 7.4 60 8.8
Sweden 34.7 7.5 50 7.3
Germany 27.7 6.0 27.6 4.0
Netherlands 28.0 6.1 28.8 4.2
Switzerland 29.7 6.4 30 4.4
Australia 13.5 2.9 20 2.9
Japan 18.3 4.0 30 4.4
USA 14.0 3.0 9 1.3
Ireland 22.1 4.8 40 5.8
New Zealand 11.5 2.5 40 5.8
UK 15.4 3.3 60 8.8
Austria 31.1 6.7 39.6 5.8
Belgium 31.9 6.9 39.6 5.8
Canada 27.9 6.0 40 5.8
Denmark 29.0 6.3 40 5.8
France 31.5 6.8 39.8 5.8
Italy 27.6 6.0 40 5.8
Total 462.5 100 684.4 100
Method
The process of scoring for each of the three constituent schemes in the
cash benefits decommodification index (pensions, unemployment and sickness)
replicates that used by Esping-Andersen (1990: 50–54) and is by way of the
numerical description of the relationship of an individual country’s score to
the mean (and standard deviation) for four (one–four) of the five factors that
make up each index. On the basis of the values on each of these four indicators
for the 18 nations, a score of one for low decommodification, two for medium
and three for high decommodification was given. Following Esping-Andersen,
the classification into three scores has been done on the basis of one standard
deviation from the mean, with adjustment where necessary for extreme outliers
(1990: 54). These individual factor scores are then added together to get a final
score which is then weighted by factor five – the percentage of the (relevant)
population covered by the programme. In line with Esping-Andersen’s approach
and his concern for the importance of replacement rates, these variables have been
given extra weight (multiplied by the factor of two) in each index. Finally, the
results of these three separate indexes – pension, unemployment and sickness –
have been combined to give the overall cash benefits decommodification score
for each country (see Tables 5, 6, and 7) (Bambra, 2004b).
The process of scoring in the health care decommodification index is
identical: the numerical description of the relationship of an individual country’s
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TABLE 5. Pension decommodification index data (1998/9).
Minimum pension benefits for Standard pension benefits Contribution period Individual share
a standard production worker for a normal worker required for a of pension Labour market
earning average wages (expressed (expressed as a replacement minimum pension financing coverage (take-up Index
as a replacement rate %) rate %) (in years) (i) (%) rate %) (ii) Score (iii)
Finland – 60 R 1.5 91 (16.4)
Norway 34 79.8 R 2.6 79 13.4
Sweden 23.4 70 R 0 87 13.9
Germany 0 35.3 5 6.8 84 7.6
Netherlands – – R 3.4 70 (10.5)
Switzerland 19.5 – – 4.2 76 (9.9)
Australia 20.6 25.6 R – 50 (6.5)
Japan 1.3 18.4 25 6.2 76 4.6
USA – 24.9 10 5.2 87 (7.0)
Ireland 30.3 46.4 3 2.0 82 9.8
New Zealand 25.8 35.8 R – 50 (6.5)
UK 5 19.6 10 3.3 77 5.4
Austria 33.9 – 1.5 3.7 89 (15.1)
Belgium 41.9 63 R 4.4 84 14.3
Canada 13.4 29.3 R 2.9 81 10.5
Denmark 2 27.6 R 2.7 83 9.1
France 40.1 – – 0.8 85 (15.3)
Italy 20 – 5 2.9 89 (10.7)
Mean 22.23 41.21 8.50 3.29 79 10.4
Notes: (i) R = residency requirement.
(ii) The statistical sources merely use phrases such as ‘all employees’ or ‘all residents’ so these are approximate coverage rates that are based on the fact that
the largest group that is most often excluded from coverage are part-time workers (Eurostat, 1997b). Means-tested programmes receive a score of only 50% for
population covered. This scoring is intended to reflect the lack of rights associated with means-tested programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54).
(iii) Figures in brackets are where there are missing values for some factors and the index figure is therefore based on the averaging out of available factor data.
Sources: Clasen, 1994: 65–6; Stahlberg, 1997: 85; Eurostat, 1998: Figures 3.1, p. 51; 3.2, p. 52; Tables 3.1, p. 54–8; 3.2, p. 61–6; Eurostat, 2000: Tables 3, p. 163–97; 6,
p. 289–367; 10, p. 533–91; OECD, 1988: Tables 1.1, p. 16; 2.2, p. 21; Chart 2.1, p. 19; OECD, 1995a: 13–30; OECD, 1995b: 222; OECD, 1996: Tables 1.3, p. 19; 2.7, p. 40;
2.8, p. 41; OECD, 1997: 17–29; US Census Bureau, 1999: 339–56; 378–94).
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TABLE 6. Unemployment decommodification index data (1998/9).
Benefit replacement rates Number of weeks of Usual number of weeks (Relevant) population
(%) for a standard worker employment prior to Number of waiting days in which benefit covered by the programme Index
during the first 26 weeks qualification for benefit before benefit is paid can be maintained (take-up rate %) (iii) Score (iv)
Finland 53 43 7 71 91 9.1
Norway 62 52 3 156 79 10.3
Sweden 80 26 5 43 87 10.4
Germany 37 52 0 52 (ii) 84 9.2
Netherlands 70 26 0 26 70 9.1
Switzerland 70 – – – 76 –
Australia – – – – 50 –
Japan 37 – – – 76 (7.6)
USA 50 – – – 87 (7.0)
Ireland
New Zealand 26 – – – 50 (2.5)
UK 16 104 3 26 77 4.6
Austria 22 52 0 20 (i) 89 7.1
Belgium 46 45 0 unlimited 84 10.0
Canada 55 – – – 81 (8.1)
Denmark 60 52 0 52 83 9.1
France 57 16 8 60 85 8.5
Italy 30 104 0 26 89 6.2
Mean 46.71 50.92 2.42 49.00 79 7.8
Notes: (i) For every 52 weeks past employment, an employee is entitled to 20 weeks unemployment benefit.
(ii) Levels vary with contribution record e.g. 6 months contributions provide an entitlement to 12 months unemployment benefit. The minimum 6 months has
been used in this case.
(iii) The statistical sources merely use phrases such as ‘all employees’ or ‘all residents’ so these are approximate coverage rates that are based on the fact that
the largest group that is most often excluded from coverage are part-time workers (Eurostat, 1997b). Means-tested programmes receive a score of only 50% for
population covered. This scoring is intended to reflect the lack of rights associated with means-tested programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54).
(iv) Figures in brackets are where there are missing values for some factors and the index figure is therefore based on the averaging out of available factor data.
(Sources: Eurostat, 1997b: 31–40; 45–55; 57–67; 91–8; 103–12; 115–25; 137–46; 147–56; 169–79; 181–93; 195–203; 213–20; Eurostat, 1998: Figures 3.1, p. 51; 3.2, p. 52;
Tables 3.1, p. 54–8; 3.2, p. 61–6; Eurostat, 2000: Tables 3, p. 163–97; 6, p. 289–367; 10, p. 533–91; OECD, 1995b: 222; OECD, 2000: Vol. 3, Table 1, p. 137).
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TABLE 7. Sickness decommodification index data (1998/9).
Benefit replacement rates (Relevant) population
(%) for a standard worker Number of weeks of Number of waiting Usual number of covered by the
during the first 26 weeks employment prior to days before benefit weeks in which benefit programme (take-up Index
of sickness qualification for benefit is paid can be maintained rate %) (iii) Score (iv)
Finland 70 0 9 43 91 9.1
Norway 100 2 0 52 79 10.3
Sweden 80 0 1 no limit 87 10.4
Germany 77(ii) 0 0 78 84 10.9
Netherlands 70 0 0 52 70 8.4
Switzerland – – – – 76 –
Australia 26.7 – – – 50 (2.5)
Japan – – – – 76 –
USA 0 n/a n/a n/a 0 0
Ireland 26.6 39 3 52 82 5.7
New Zealand 38.3 – – – 50 (2.5)
UK 17.5 26 3 52 77 5.4
Austria 57.7(i) 2 3 52 89 8.9
Belgium 60 26 1 52 84 7.6
Canada – – – – 81 –
Denmark 100 8 0 52 83 10.8
France 50 26 3 52 85 7.7
Italy 100 0 3 26 89 10.7
Mean 62.4 10.75 2.17 51.18 79 7.9
Notes: (i) 6 weeks benefit at a replacement rate of 50%, remaining weeks at 60%.
(ii) 6 weeks benefit at a replacement rate of 100%, remaining weeks at 70%.
(iii) The statistical sources merely use phrases such as ‘all employees’ or ‘all residents’ so these are approximate coverage rates that are based on the fact that
the largest group that is most often excluded from coverage are part-time workers (Eurostat, 1997b). Means-tested programmes receive a score of only 50% for
population covered. This scoring is intended to reflect the lack of rights associated with means-tested programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54).
(iv) Figures in brackets are where there are missing values for some factors and the index figure is therefore based on the averaging out of available factor data.
Sources: Eurostat, 1998: Figures 3.1, p. 51; 3.2, p. 52; Tables 3.1, p. 54–8; 3.2, p. 61–6; Eurostat, 2000: Tables 3, p. 163–97; 6, p. 289–367; 10, p. 533–91; OECD, 1988:
Tables 1.1, p. 16; 2.2, p. 21; Chart 2.1, p. 19; OECD, 1995a: 13–30; OECD, 1995b: 222; OECD, 1996: Tables 1.3, p. 19; 2.7, p. 40; 2.8, p. 41; OECD, 1997: 17–29).
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TABLE 8. Health care services index data (1998).
Private health Private hospital Public health care
expenditure beds (% of total system coverage Index
(% of GDP) bed stock) (% of population) score
Finland 1.7 4.7 100.0 50
Norway 1.3 0.32 100.0 60
Sweden 1.5 20.3 100.0 50
Germany 2.3 50.1 92.2 27.6
Netherlands 2.4 22.4(ii) 72.0 28.8
Switzerland 3.1 22.4(ii) 100.0 30
Australia 2.6 54.9 100.0 20
Japan 1.6 71.2 100.0 30
USA 7.5 81.6 45.0 9
Ireland 1.7 22.4(ii) 100.0 40
New Zealand 1.8 25.8(iii) 100.0 40
UK 1.0 3.7 100.0 60
Austria 2.2 29.7 99.0 39.6
Belgium 0.9 61.8 99.0 39.6
Canada 2.9 0.8 100.0 40
Denmark 2.7 0.0 100.0 40
France 2.2 35.4 99.5 39.8
Italy 2.3 24.0 100.0 40
Mean 2.0(i) 22.3(iv) 95.2 38.0
Notes: (i) Adjusted for extreme outliers (USA).
(ii) EU average.
(iii) Unadjusted mean.
(iv) Adjusted for extreme outliers (Denmark, and USA).
Sources: OECD, 2000: Chapters 3, 5, 7; WHO, 2002.
score to the mean (and standard deviation) for two (one and two) of the three
factors that make up the index. These individual factor scores are then added
together to get a final score which is then weighted by factor three – the percentage
of the population covered by the health care system on the basis of 100 per cent
coverage providing a weighting of 10, 92 per cent coverage a weighting of 9.2
and so on (see Table 8). Coverage is used as a weight because, as with the use
of coverage/take-up rate in the cash benefit decommodification index, it is the
most important issue for public health care systems. A health care system that
has a high proportion of public funding and provision but that only provides
service access to a small proportion of the population cannot be regarded as
highly decommodifying.
Results
In order to meaningfully compare the results of the two different indexes,
the different index scales have been equalised (see Table 4). The individual
country score for each index has been translated into a percentage of the total
decommodification score produced by that index. So, for example, France’s
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Figure 1. Decommodification of cash benefits compared with health care services.
unadjusted cash benefits decommodification score was 31.5 and its health care
services score was 39.8, but when adjusted and expressed as a percentage of the
total decommodification in the respective index they are 6.8 and 5.8.
The cash benefits index shows a wide variety of scores from 2.9 (Australia) to
7.5 (Sweden). The health services index has a similar spread with scores ranging
from the outlier score of 1.4 (USA) to 9.0 (Norway and UK). Some countries
have very similar scores in both the cash benefits and health care services indexes:
Australia scores 2.9 for cash benefit decommodification and 2.9 for health care
services decommodification, Canada and Italy both score 6.0 for cash benefits
and 5.8 for health care services. Other countries have very divergent scores with
either cash benefits or health care services exhibiting higher decommodification
levels. For example, Germany scores 6.0 for cash benefits but only 4.0 for health
care services, whereas the UK scores only 3.3 for cash benefits and 8.8 for health
care services.
These differences in internal decommodification scores can be more
adequately explored by plotting the countries’ cash benefit decommodification
scores against their health care services decommodification score (Figure 1).
Figure 1 also demonstrates the inter-relationships of the countries and
how they divide into five groupings based on their above/below average scores
(depicted by the cross-hairs). The first group of countries (Finland, Norway and
Sweden) score highly in both cash benefit and health service decommodification.
The second group of countries (Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands)
score more highly on cash benefits decommodification; and the third group of
countries (Ireland, New Zealand and the UK) score more highly on health care
service decommodification. The fourth group of countries (Australia, Japan and
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the USA) have low scores for both cash benefit and health service decommodi-
fication. The decommodification scores of the fifth group of countries (Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and Italy) are very close to the index average
for both cash benefits and health care services.
Discussion
These results suggest that there is significant internal diversity within the welfare
state arrangements of some countries. Ireland, New Zealand and the UK all
have higher decommodification scores for health care services than would be
expected from their ‘Liberal’ regime cash benefits score. Similarly, Germany, the
Netherlands and Switzerland score lower for health care than would be expected
from their ‘Conservative’ cash benefit score. This indicates that certain welfare
states do vary internally in terms of the emphasis that they place upon different
types of social provision, with some focusing on cash benefits and others on
welfare services (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Castles, 1998; Kautto, 2002). Therefore
it cannot be assumed that a country’s approach to one aspect of welfare state
provision can be generalised to explain all others (Kasza, 2002: 284; Bambra,
2005). However, the results also show that some countries are more consistent in
their approach to welfare state provision. Most notably, the Social Democratic
countries score similarly above average for cash benefits and health care services,
and the USA, Japan and Australia score similarly low.
More significantly, the comparison of the two indexes also raises more
questions about the differences between countries and the number of different
types of welfare state regimes (Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Kangas,
1994; Ragin, 1994; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Pitruzzello, 1999). The comparison
suggests that there are five possible welfare state groupings when cash benefits
and health care services are compared with one another. The composition of
the high scoring group – Finland, Norway, Sweden – reflects a tenant of welfare
regime theory: the existence of a distinctive Scandinavian regime that provides
consistently high levels of provision (Titmuss, 1974; Therborn, 1987; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996;
Bonoli, 1997; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Sainsbury, 1999;
Korpi, 2000). The position of countries such as Germany, Switzerland and the
Netherlands, to some extent reflects comments that the Conservative regime
countries tend to place more emphasis upon cash benefits in their welfare mix
(Castles, 1998), and the division of the Liberal regime countries – Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the USA – into two distinctive
groups, one that is consistently low in welfare decommodification and one that
is more service orientated, gives credence to claims about a fourth – radical (for
example, Castles and Mitchell, 1993) – world of welfare that is a sub-type of the
Liberal regime.
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The identification of two additional groupings, sub-regimes, within the
Conservative and Liberal ‘worlds of welfare’, suggests that welfare services in these
countries are based upon different, politically structured, principles from their
respective cash benefit programmes. The Conservative sub-group countries –
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands – all score more highly on cash
benefits than welfare services, and the Liberal sub-group countries – Ireland, New
Zealand and the UK – all score more highly on services than cash benefits. The
imbalance within these countries’ welfare mix perhaps reflects Kasza’s assertions
that welfare policy making is politically inconsistent and disjointed. He asserts
that the cumulative nature of welfare policy making – the diverse histories of
different policy areas, the variation of policy actors across different fields, dif-
ferences in the policy-making process and the influence on policy of foreign
welfare models – all undermine the likelihood of a coherent approach to welfare
provision within a country (Kasza, 2002). These differences would be particularly
apparent in a comparison of such diverse aspects of welfare policy as cash benefits
and health care services which, as Kasza points out, aside from a common
normative role in satisfying human need, have very little in common with one
another. However, it should also be noted that, in contrast to Kasza’s overall con-
clusion that welfare states are too internally inconsistent to validate the regimes
concept, the majority of the 18 countries analysed in this article have shown con-
sistency in their cash benefits and welfare services mix. It is perhaps therefore the
case that certain countries, such as Sweden on the one hand or the USA on the
other, are more cohesive and uniform in their welfare state construction and
the political philosophy behind it, than others, such as the UK or Germany, that
demonstrate a more fragmented approach to cash benefits and welfare services.
Conclusions
This examination of the cash versus services mix of welfare state arrangements –
through the comparison of decommodification levels of cash benefit programmes
and health care services – has highlighted the importance of welfare services.
In demonstrating significant internal inconsistency within some countries’
provision of cash benefits and health care services, this article has reinforced
and expanded the findings of earlier research on health care decommodification
(Bambra, 2005) as well as Kasza’s more general critique of the ‘illusory’ nature of
welfare state regimes (Kasza, 2002). More significantly, though, the inclusion of
services has suggested that welfare states divide into not three (Esping-Andersen,
1990, 1999), or four (Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Korpi,
2000; Bambra, 2005), but five different clusters (Pitzurello, 1999): (1) Finland,
Norway, Sweden; (2) Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland; (3) Australia, Japan,
USA; (4) Ireland, New Zealand, UK; (5) Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France and Italy. However, it is unclear as to whether the extra two clusters
should be considered as distinctive regime types or merely as subgroups of the
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Liberal and Conservative ‘worlds of welfare’, perhaps reflecting different political
attitudes to the roles of cash benefits or welfare services. Further research into the
five clusters, perhaps incorporating other services such as social care or education,
is needed before firmer conclusions can be drawn.
Welfare states cannot be accurately analysed and classified by cash benefit
programmes alone. Welfare state modelling, and the construction of typologies,
needs to encapsulate the full diversity of a welfare state, or welfare state regime, by
examining as many aspects of provision and service delivery as possible. Services
are a vital element of welfare state provision and they need to be more adequately
reflected in comparative research. It will be more fruitful if future attempts at
welfare state modelling combined both cash and services (Daly and Lewis, 2000).
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